Understanding Consciousness—Have We Cut the Gordian Knot or Not? (Integration, Unity, and the Self) by Van Gulick, Robert
Philosophic Exchange
Volume 45 | Number 1 Article 2
8-23-2016
Understanding Consciousness—Have We Cut the
Gordian Knot or Not? (Integration, Unity, and the
Self )
Robert Van Gulick
Syracuse University, rnvangul@syr.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex
Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons
@Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more
information, please contact kmyers@brockport.edu.
Repository Citation
Van Gulick, Robert (2016) "Understanding Consciousness—Have We Cut the Gordian Knot or Not? (Integration, Unity, and the
Self)," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 45 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol45/iss1/2
  
Understanding Consciousness—Have We 
Cut the Gordian Knot or Not? 
(Integration, Unity, and the Self) 
Robert Van Gulick 
Syracuse University 
 
 
In his 1992 book Consciousness Reconsidered, the philosopher Owen 
Flanagan noted that there are three great mysteries: Why does the 
universe exist? What is life? And what is consciousness? What is 
the status of the three mysteries today in the early twenty first 
century? Have these mysteries been solved? Or do they remain 
unexplained? And if any remain unsolved today, what are our 
prospects for doing so in the near or distant future?   
The first mystery concerns the very fact of existence: Why does 
the universe exist? Why is there something rather nothing? Con-
temporary physicists can tell us a lot about the origin of the 
universe. According to our best understanding of the data, the uni-
verse began in the so called ‘big bang” approximately 13.8 billion 
years ago. Physicists are able to determine the state of the universe 
back to the earliest nanoseconds of its existence. They may even be 
able to explain the occurrence of the big bang itself, perhaps in 
terms of cosmic inflation models, for which there is strong though 
not yet conclusive evidence. Those inflation models explain how 
local quantum fluctuations in the vacuum energy state might lead 
to exponentially expanding spacetime bubbles, i.e. to spacetimes 
that rapidly expand at an accelerating rate, before slowing to a 
nonaccelerating rate giving rise to a complete spacetime universe 
like our own. The models match and explain many features 
observed in the large scale structure of the universe, such as the 
uniformity of the background radiation.  
Do such models resolve the mystery of why there is something 
rather than nothing or do they merely push the question back a 
step? Following an ancient philosophical doctrine going back to the 
Greek Parmenides and the Roman Lucretius, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas famously affirmed the principle, “Ex nihilo, nihil fit”—
“From nothing comes nothing”—or as we might put in more 
contemporary terms, “You can’t get something from nothing.” But 
perhaps we can. According to the inflation models expanding 
spacetime bubbles can arise from the vacuum or zero energy state. 
From the perspective of quantum mechanics even the zero energy 
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state has quantum fluctuations that could lead to inflation. Does 
the fact that such exponentially expanding bubbles could result 
from the zero energy state show that you can indeed get something 
from nothing? Or does it merely show that from the metaphysical 
perspective, the zero energy state, though zero, is still a something 
rather than a nothing, though if it were a something it would be a very 
strange something, one that stands outside of space and time. 
What is the status of the second mystery: What is life? If we 
were to go back hundred years ago to 1916 in the early twentieth 
century, we would find some genuine disagreement within the 
scientific and philosophical community about whether or not life 
could be understood in terms of the same factors and laws that 
operated in the nonbiological world. Some argued that explaining 
life and the processes within living organisms required appeal to 
factors over and above those involved in physics and chemistry—
such as vital forces, so called “elan vital” or special organizing 
forces or “entelechies.” These were posited to be independent 
additional causal aspects of reality beyond those present in the 
nonbiological realm. Appeal to these factors was regarded as 
essential, and thus any attempt to explain life solely in terms of 
underlying chemical or molecular structure was doomed to fail.  In 
1913 the eminent British physiologist, J.B.S. Haldane rejected the 
mechanistic theory of life in favor of organicism. He wrote, “We 
perceive the organism as a self-regulating entity,…. every effort to 
analyze it into components that can be reduced to a mechanical 
explanation violates this central experience” (Haldane 1913). 
However, vitalism and anti-mechanism ceased to be serious 
hypotheses with the revolution in genetics and molecular biology 
that began with the discovery in 1954 of the structure of DNA by 
Francis Crick and John Watson and soon thereafter of its basic 
operation in processes of coding, transcription and replication. 
Admittedly there is a great deal that we are still learning about the 
relevant genetic and molecular processes, such as the recent recog-
nition of the important role played by epigenetic factors, molecules 
that can attach to genes and modulate their activity, sometime as 
the result environmental interactions. Epigenetics helps explain 
how gene activity gets shaped by one’s individual history and envi-
ronment. Our knowledge of the specifics is far from complete. We 
certainly cannot at present tell the full story that gets you from a 
fertilized moose zygote to an adult bull moose, but we have a sense 
that we know in general “how the trick is done.” We can fit living 
organisms into reality as complex, self-regulating and self-replicat-
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ing biochemical systems that have evolved through Darwinian 
selection. The problem of explaining life no longer seems like a 
mystery, but just another difficult but solvable problem for on-
going scientific research to fill in the details. 
The third mystery—the mystery of consciousness, is the most 
specific of the three. Even if we were to understand why there is 
something (a universe), and how living things exist, we might still 
be puzzled about how any of those things – living or not – is 
conscious? It seems we can imagine a possible world with physics, 
chemistry and even biology, but nothing that is conscious. Atoms, 
oceans and even living things might exist in the total absence of 
consciousness, e.g. a world of rivers, mountains bacteria and even 
plants but devoid of any conscious mind to observe it. The third 
mystery is perhaps also the one that appears most elusive. Can we 
understand what consciousness is, and how it fits into the rest of 
reality? In particular, can we explain consciousness scientifically in 
terms of underlying physical, chemical or neural structures and 
processes? Or to frame the issue more generally: Can we explain 
the nature and existence of consciousness in terms of components 
that are not conscious? In current debates, some say “yes”, but 
others say “no.” 
The problem of consciousness has a long history. In the 
nineteenth century, the English biologist and ardent defender of 
Darwinian theory, Thomas Huxley famously wrote, “How it is that 
anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as 
a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the 
appearance of the Djinn, when Aladdin rubbed his lamp”(Huxley 1866). In 
mid twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein expressed the sense of 
bafflement we supposedly feel when considering consciousness. 
He imagines someone clasping his forehead and exclaiming, ‘This 
is supposed to be produced in the brain!.” He goes on to describe 
it as “the feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness 
and brain process… The idea of a difference in kind is accomp-
anied by a slight giddiness – which occurs when we performing a 
piece of logical sleight of hand” (Wittgenstein Philosophical Investi-
gations I, 412, 1953). Wittgenstein himself was suspicious of such 
intuitions, but he leaves no doubt that they were widely and 
powerfully held. 
What is the status of our third mystery today in the early twenty 
first century? To what extent have we succeeded in explaining the 
nature and existence of consciousness, and how it fits into the 
physical world? In terms of our title, have we succeeded in “cutting 
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the Gordian knot”? In ancient history or myth, Alexander the 
Great, confronted a knot in the ancient kingdom of Gordia that 
bound a ritual cart as a symbol of kingship to the wall of the royal 
palace, a knot so strong and intricate that Alexander could find no 
ends from which he might begin to untie it. He decisively solved 
the problem by slicing the knot with his sword and freeing the ends 
to undo it. “Cutting the Gordian knot” has thus become a 
metaphor for solving an seemingly intractable problem by bold and 
novel action that opens new avenue to solution, an ancient version 
of “thinking outside the box.” Have philosophers or scientists 
found a way to cut the Gordian knot of consciousness, a way to 
gain the new perspective needed to resolve our third mystery? 
Current opinion differs on the answer. 
In his seminal 1974 paper, “What is it like to be a bat?”, 
Thomas Nagel argued that the subjective nature of consciousness 
places severe, and perhaps insuperable, limits on our ability to 
understand consciousness from the objective perspective of nat-
ural science. Nagel uses the example of bats that perceive and 
navigate through echo-location to illustrate his point about the 
special sort of understanding associated with conscious experience. 
Using Nagel’s famous phrase, “there is something that it is like to 
be a bat”, i.e. a qualitative phenomenal aspect of what bat 
experience is like for the bat itself, how it experiences the world 
from its particular sensory perspective. Nagel argues that no 
amount of knowledge of the bat’s neurophysiology or of the 
organization of its information processing will enable us to fully 
understand “what it is like for the bat” from the inside. Our sensory 
experience is too unlike the bat’s for us to be able to comprehend 
bat’s experience in the sympathetic way in which we can under-
stand human experiences. We cannot adequately take up the bat’s 
experiential perspective since our own is too dissimilar. 
Nagel goes on to argue that any reductive program that aims to 
fully explain conscious experience in terms of objective science will 
fail to capture the distinctive what-it-is-likeness of subjective 
experience. Indeed, he claims we have no real understanding of 
how the two might fit together; they seem so dissimilar that trying 
to link them leaves us blank. Our current position, he suggests, is 
akin to that of ancient pre-Socratic philosophers trying to under-
stand the contemporary equation of matter and energy. We lack the 
basic conceptual framework to begin to see how the two might be 
linked. 
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Colin McGinn also argues that we unable to understand the 
physical basis of consciousness in an intelligible way, though his 
reasons are different than Nagel’s. According to McGinn (1989), 
the residual mystery results not from any metaphysical facts but 
from facts about our human cognitive limits, especially limits on 
our capacities for forming concepts. McGinn argues that we hu-
mans are unable to adequately grasp how “the water of brain is 
turned into the wine of consciousness” because we are unable use 
to either perception, introspection or inference to acquire the 
concepts needed to make the psycho-physical nexus intuitively 
transparent. Though other beings with different cognitive 
capacities may be able grasp the link, for us humans it must remain 
a mystery. 
In considering how the mystery of consciousness fares relative 
to the other two, it is worth noting that all three mysteries have a 
similar form. Where F is some property, each mystery is of the form: 
“How can you get something that is F from things that are not F ?” 
The first mystery #1 is: “How can you get something that exists 
from what does not exist? The second mystery #2 is: “How can you 
get something that is alive from things (parts) that are not alive? And 
mystery #3 is: “How can get something that is conscious from things 
(parts) that are not conscious? 
Despite their similar form, our ability to answer the question 
and resolve the mystery may be quite different in the three cases, 
and even those who believe we can answer the second and perhaps 
the first, may be more pessimistic about our prospects with respect 
to the third. One hundred years ago in 1916, life was still a mystery; 
today it is not. Will consciousness be explained in the 21st century 
as life was explained in the 20th century? Will we soon be able to 
explain how consciousness depends on the brain just as we can 
explain how life depends on DNA and the rest of our molecular 
biochemistry? Are the two problems basically similar or different 
in some important way? 
Many philosophers and neuroscientists believe it is just a matter 
of time–and not too much time–until the mystery of consciousness 
is solved and non-physical views are as ‘dead’ as vitalism is today. 
Among philosophers for example, John Searle (1997) argues for a 
biologically naturalistic view of consciousness, Paricia Churchland 
(1994) appeals to neural network models, and Jesse Prinz (2012) 
offers his Attended Intermediate Representation (AIR) theory of 
consciousness which includes specific claims about how conscious-
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ness in neurally realized by gamma oscillations in the relevant mid-
level sensory neurons. 
By contrast, other philosophers argue that the mystery of 
consciousness is fundamentally different from the problem of life 
and the method that worked for explaining life cannot be used for 
explaining consciousness. That mode of argument is offered most 
prominently by David Chalmers (1996), but is also supported by 
Galen Strawson (2006) who advocates panpsychism, and by dual-
ists like Brie Gertler (2007). Chalmers famously distinguished 
between what he called the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness, and 
various “Easy Problems”(or at least far easier problems) of con-
sciousness. The “easy problems” all deal with the functional 
aspects of consciousness (e.g., how it processes information, 
interacts with memory, or controls behavior) and with how those 
functional processes might be realized by neural mechanisms. 
These Chalmers says are tough ongoing scientific problems but not 
mysteries, and they are analogous to the problems that were solved 
by modern molecular biology in the last half century. Those 
biological problems also involved accurately modeling functional 
processes—such as reproduction, growth or metabolism—and 
explaining how those functional processes might be realized by 
underlying molecular mechanisms. By contrast, the “Hard Prob-
lem” is that of explaining how subjective phenomenal conscious-
ness, what-it-is-likeness, comes about. How could qualitative 
phenomenal consciousness be the result of purely physical neural 
processes? It is this so called “Hard Problem” that generates an air 
of mystery and leaves us deeply perplexed. The resistance to 
solution derives in part from the supposed fact that being 
phenomenal conscious is not a functional property, or at least not 
in essence a merely functional property. Phenomenal consciousness 
may have some functional aspects and being phenomenal 
consciously may give one various functional capacities, but 
according to Chalmers the central feature of consciousness, very 
much like Nagel’s ‘what-it-is-likeness, is not captured by those 
functional properties. Thus the two-part strategy that worked for 
explaining life—specify the essential properties of life in terms of 
functional processes, and then explain how those processes are 
realized by underlying physical mechanisms—supposedly cannot 
be used to solve the mystery of consciousness. If as Chalmers 
argues, the thing to be explained—phenomenal consciousness 
itself—is not in essence a functional property or process, then the 
first part of the strategy cannot be carried out. Describing the func-
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tional aspects of consciousness speaks only to the supposed easy 
problems, and fails to capture the essence of consciousness, leaving 
the strategy inadequate to address the Hard Problem. 
However, one might question Chalmers views about the rela-
tion between the two sorts of problems. Chalmers assumes that 
making progress on the functional problems about the organiz-
ation and operation of consciousness and their neural basis – the 
so called “easy problems”—will not be of much help in solving the 
“Hard Problem” because he believes they are fundamentally 
different in kind. But is that assumption correct? Perhaps as we 
build our theories and detailed models of the functional aspects of 
consciousness we will get the insight we need to solve the Hard 
Problem—or at least make progress on it. 
The special divide that supposedly exists in the case of con-
sciousness is sometimes described as that between the objective and 
subjective facts about conscious experience. Fact about ‘what-it-is-
likeness’ are said to be subjective in that they can be fully known 
or understood only empathetically by one’s being able to imagine the 
relevant quality of experience (or what-it-is-likeness)—i.e., to imagine 
having that type of experience oneself—which requires being able 
experience the world from a similar point-of-view. It is claimed that 
you cannot get a full or adequate understanding of subjective con-
sciousness from any theory of objective facts of the sort you would 
get from neuroscience or any other empirical science. 
Once again we can see this question as taking the same basic 
logical form as our other mysteries: How can you get something 
that is subjective from things (or parts) that are not subjective (that are 
objective). Indeed, it is possible that particular how-question has no 
answer. Thus the even more basic question is: Can you get 
something subjective from things (or parts) that are objective? Is it even 
possible to do so? It is worth noting in this regard that subjectivity 
requires a subject. There cannot be any experiential states that have a 
subjective aspect—some way in which they appear—unless there is 
some subject to whom they appear in that way. The notion of a pain 
that is not the pain of any subject is not really coherent. A state 
cannot be a pain with its subjective aspect of hurtfulness unless 
there is some subject who feels or experiences that pain, some 
subject to whom it appears as hurtful. Subjective facts require a subject 
or self. Thus in considering whether or not we can get subjective 
facts from objective facts, we need to address the question of 
whether and how one might construct a subject out of objective 
parts. 
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So where do things stand at present with regard to explaining 
consciousness? And what would explaining consciousness involve? 
What sorts of questions would we need to be able to answer to 
count as successfully explaining it? As I have described elsewhere 
(Van Gulick 2005), the various explanations required can be 
grouped under three main questions. 
 
1. The What Question (descriptive): What is consciousness? What 
are its principal features? By what means can they be best discovered, 
described and modeled? Of special importance is the contrast between 
so called first-person and third-person methods. First-person methods 
might be described as those by which we learn about the mind 
subjectively “from the inside” through various forms of introspection and 
self-awareness, including both our everyday self-awareness and more 
highly developed forms of self-awareness made possible by phen-
omenological analysis or meditative practices. Third-person 
methods, by contrast, are often described as those in which we 
learn about mind “from the outside.” Third-person methods for 
studying consciousness would include psychological lab studies, 
brain-imaging studies, and deficit studies in which diverse mental 
deficits are observed to correlate with damage to various specific 
brain regions. The consensus is that both sorts of methods are 
relevant and useful for studying consciousness, and multiple meth-
ods of both types should be used in complementary and mutually 
supporting ways. A successful explanation of consciousness should 
integrate our first-person and third-person data and theories. 
 
2. The How Question (explanatory): How does consciousness 
of the relevant sort come to exist? Is it a primitive aspect of reality? If 
it is not primitive, then how does (or could) consciousness in the 
relevant respect arise from or be caused by nonconscious entities or 
processes? 
 
3. The Why Question (functional): Why does consciousness of the 
relevant sort exist? Does it have a function, and if so what it is it?  Does it 
act causally, and if so with what sorts of effects? Does it make a difference 
to the operation of systems in which it is present, and if so why and how? 
 
Attempts to answer these questions empirically often make use 
of contrast studies, i.e. experimental setups that allow one to 
compare the differences between conscious and unconscious men-
tal state and processing, e.g. the differences between conscious and 
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unconscious visual perception or between conscious and uncon-
scious cases of memory and learning. The experiments aim to 
produce pairs of mental states—e.g. visual states—that are as much 
like each other as possible except that one is conscious and the 
other is not. It is possible to produce such conscious/ unconscious 
pairs by varying key stimulus parameters such as the exposure 
duration of a visual stimulus, or by manipulating other contextual 
factors such as the subject’s focus of attention. Given sets of such 
contrasting states, it is possible to assess what differences con-
sciousness makes to the nature of such states, including both 
functional differences in the kinds of processing involved and also 
neurological differences in the brain regions and types of neural 
activity involved respectively in the conscious and unconscious 
cases. The specific methods used in such contrast studies include: 
near and below threshold stimulation, backward masking, 
binocular rivalry (with attentional modulation), the “attentional 
blink” effect, and various sorts of deficit studies such those involv-
ing hemi-neglect or blindsight. For present purposes, we can 
consider two of those methods—backward masking and binocular 
rivalry—which will give a good sense of how such contrast studies 
work. 
In a backward masking experiment a visual stimulus is present-
ed to the subject for a very brief period of time, typically between 
forty and fifty milliseconds (ms), and then followed by another 
stimulus (the “mask”) which is presented for a longer interval. 
Subjects typically do not report having seen the first stimulus at all. 
They report seeing only the second. Yet experimental tests can 
show that the first stimulus was visually processed to a high degree 
and recognized despite the subject lack of any conscious awareness 
of it. For example, the unconscious stimulus may bias the subject’s 
subsequent response to conscious but unclear or ambiguous 
stimuli. If the masked stimulus of which the subjects remain 
unconscious showed an image of a tree, they are more likely to 
interpret the ambiguous word “palm” as referring to a palm tree 
rather than to a part of the hand. Thus the unconscious visual 
perception of the masked image would seem to have been of a 
fairly high level that involved a recognition of its meaning. 
One can look at the subjects’ patterns of brain activity data 
during a backward masking experiment by using by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). What one finds are both 
similarities and major differences between the cases of conscious 
and unconscious perception. Both the consciously seen and 
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unconscious masked stimuli evoke a succession of neural active-
tions across the full visual cortex, beginning in areas V1 and V2 
where initial processing of the retinal output occurs, and continu-
ing all the way up to later levels of processing in inferior temporal 
(IT) cortex that are involved in higher level processes such as object 
recognition and conceptual categorization. However, in the con-
scious case, activation also spreads to the frontal cortex and 
importantly the frontal cortex sends activation back to the visual 
cortex producing a sustained recurrent activation of the firing 
produced by the initial visual processing.  The results thus suggest 
that such sustained recurrent activation involving both the visual 
and frontal cortex is required for conscious visual perception, 
though the correct interpretation of the data remains a matter of 
ongoing debate, with some arguing that more local recurrent 
activation solely within the visual cortex may by itself suffice to 
produce conscious perception without any need for the added 
involvement of frontal processes. 
Binocular rivalry experiments involve project different images 
to each of a subject’s two eyes—perhaps a man’s face is projected 
to one eye and a city scene to the other. The subject perceptually 
processes both images but can be consciously aware of only one at 
a time. Subjects report that the images alternate spontaneously, 
back and forth (Logothetis 199x). First they are aware of the man’s 
face, then of the city scene, and then it flips again to the face. The 
flipping back and forth enables researchers to isolate the neural 
signature of conscious processing. Because faces and scenes are 
known to be processed in distinct and identifiable brain regions—
the fusiform face area (FFA) and the parahippocampal place area 
(PPA)—fMRI monitors can track what changes when the subject 
flips from being aware of the man’s face to being aware of the 
cityscape. With binocular rivalry, both of the specialized processing 
regions stay active to some degree, reflecting the fact that both the 
conscious and the unconscious images are being processed to a 
high level of analysis. However, the cortical processing region 
associated with the currently conscious percept—whether the face 
region or the scene region—shows an increased level of activation 
and more importantly does so in part by receiving reciprocal 
activations from other cortical regions including the frontal cortex. 
Alternating conscious perceptions of a face and of a scene correlate 
with alternating increases of activation in the associated cortical 
regions, the FFA and PPA, driven in part by increased integration 
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with activity in other cortical regions, especially frontal and parietal 
regions associated with attention. 
Contrast studies of these two sorts and others, can be used to 
try and discover the so called “neural correlates of consciousness” 
(NCCs) as an essential step in trying to understand how conscious-
ness might result from physical or neural processes.  If we know 
what physical brain states correlate with consciousness and what is 
different physically in the brain when we are in a conscious state, 
then we may be able to use that knowledge to figure out how such 
physical states might be able to produce consciousness. However, 
there are some important limits to keep mind in basing any 
conclusions about the physical basis of consciousness on data from 
contrast studies about the NCCs. Most importantly, as the term 
itself implies, NCCs are merely correlates of consciousness, states 
that co-occur with the cases of conscious perception. From the fact 
that are present in the conscious cases, it does not follow that those 
neural features are the basis or neural substrate of consciousness. 
Alternative hypotheses could also account for the observed 
correlations. Rather than being identical with consciousness, the 
NCCs might be the causal precursors of consciousness, or they might 
be downstream effects of consciousness, such as those involved in 
linguistically reporting the occurrence of the state, which is often 
used a criterion for determining when a state is conscious. Such 
causes or effects of consciousness would also be picked out by 
contrast studies as differentially present only in the conscious cases. 
So additional argument is needed to move from correlational data 
about NCCs to any conclusion about the neural substrate of 
consciousness itself. 
Using the contrast method, it has also been possible to learn a 
lot about the functional differences between conscious and 
unconscious mental states and processes, e.g., between conscious 
and unconscious visual perceptions. Information that is conscious-
ly perceived or remembered is available for a wider more flexible 
range of uses and applications and is integrated with a wider range 
of other information. Thus conscious information is in that sense 
more unified—both functionally and in terms of its content. Con-
scious information exists within a larger more interactive network 
of connections. Given that enhanced functional and informational 
integration is one of the key features that distinguishes conscious 
from unconscious states, it will be appropriate to focus the last 
section of this paper on the unity of consciousness. 
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One important answer to the “What question” about the 
principal features of consciousness is that consciousness is unified 
in various ways. We observe this by both first person and third 
person methods. Understanding consciousness in part involves 
understanding what those various unities of consciousness are, and how 
they are produced. Though consciousness is generally agreed to be 
unified in some important respect, there less clarity or consensus 
about the specific respects in which it is unified and to what degree. 
Competing theories differ both in what they take the relevant 
form(s) of unity to be and what their status is: Are they necessary 
features of consciousness? Sufficient for consciousness? Or merely 
associated with consciousness. There is also disagreement about 
the order of dependence between consciousness and unity. Is the 
relevant information conscious because it is unified? Or is the inform-
ation unified because it is conscious? The first option treats the relevant 
sort of unity as constitutive of conscious; it is being unified in the 
required way that the makes the state (or its informational content) 
conscious. Consciousness just is unity of the requisite type. On the 
second option, consciousness if regarded as having an essential 
nature that is distinctive from unity but which produces unity. On 
this second view, unity is an effect of consciousness rather than its 
constitutive essence. 
The thesis that consciousness is unified has a long history in 
philosophy. In the seventeenth century René Descartes wrote, 
“For in truth, when I consider the mind, that is, when I consider 
myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in 
myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat 
absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to 
be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other 
part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from 
my mind; nor can the faculties of willing, perceiving, conceiving, 
etc., properly be called its parts, for it is the same mind that is exer-
cised in willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving, etc.” (Descartes 
,Meditation VI, section 1641). 
There are many different types of conscious unity. One major 
division is between synchronic forms of unity, which involve unity 
at a single moment of time, and diachronic forms of unity which 
involve unity relations across extended periods of time. For exam-
ple, the unity involved in perceiving an integrated real world scene 
seems primarily like a form of synchronic unity—involving unifica-
tion of all the diverse contents that are represented by that momen-
tary perceptual states. By contrast, the unity involved in episodic or 
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autobiographical memory seems to involve a diachronic form of 
unity, in so far as it involves an identification of past and presents 
selves as the single ongoing personal subject of experience. When 
I have such a memory, I appear to remember myself having that 
past conscious experience—I do not just remember that I drank 
coffee, I remember myself consciously drinking the coffee. Thus 
such memory depends in part on diachronic forms of unity as does 
very nature of personal identity itself. 
Both synchronic and diachronic unity occur in many different 
specific forms, of which some of the most important include the 
following: 
 
• Representational Unity—(coherent connections among contents) 
• Object Unity—(representational unity of multiple features as pre-
sent in a single object) 
• Multi-Object/Scene Unity—representational unity of multiple 
features and objects as present in a single integrated scene or situa-
tion. 
• World Unity—representational unity of multiple feature, objects, 
scenes and events existing as parts of a single unified world.  
• Spatial Unity—representation of multiple, dimensions, and loca-
tions present as parts of a larger unified space. 
• Multi-modal Unity—Unity in perceptual representation or aware-
ness of information derived from multiple senses such as touch, vi-
sion and audition. 
• Subject Unity—the unity of the conscious subject both at a time 
and across time. 
• Introspective Unity—unity of the information made available by 
introspection from multiple aspects of the mind. 
• Phenomenal Unity—the sort of unity present in phenomenal 
conscious experience, i.e., as a feature which is present phenomen-
ally as part of our experience, one that we experience as a unity—
what we might call experience unity.          
The so called “binding problem” in visual perception illustrates 
several of these types of unity. The binding problem is in essence 
the question of explaining how the many local partial representa-
tions that are activated in specific regions of the visual cortex 
related to different aspects of the visual stimulus are bound into a 
single unified representation or precept. For example shape, color 
and motion are all separately computed by distinct local regions of 
the visual cortex. How are they bound into a single unified repre-
senttation of a quickly moving red circle? It is not done by sending 
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their results to some executive module—a “homunculus” —where 
a single combined representation is produced. The representations 
of color, shape and motion continue to be realized locally by neural 
activations in their distinct specialized cortical regions. Thus bind-
ing must involve some larger relation among those local active-
tions. Some dynamic relation need to be established among them 
to bind them together into a single integrated percept of the 
external object, scene and world. Some have proposed that they are 
bound together by synchronized oscillations, in particular of gam-
ma oscillations in the 40 Hz band. The idea is that neuron groups 
that oscillate and fire together also represent together in a unified 
and integrated way. The hypothesis remains under active consider-
ation and debate. 
Many current theories of consciousness appeal to some form 
of integration or unification between diverse items of information, 
contents, functions or subsystems as a key feature of conscious-
ness. They all explain the transition from merely unconscious 
information or mental states and to conscious ones as involving 
the addition of some larger unifying relation among local states that 
are narrower both in their contents and in their specific neural 
bases. However, they differ in about what they take that larger 
unifying relation to be.  
The global neuronal workspace model (GNWS) was first pro-
posed by psychologist Bernard Baars in the late 1980’s (1988) and 
further developed by numerous researchers especially by Stanislas 
Dehaene (2014) and his research group in Paris. According to 
GNWS, the transition from unconscious to conscious state involv-
es the incorporation of the relevant state and its content into global 
activation structure that the makes that information globally 
available to other modules for use and that is mediated in part by 
reciprocal relations between the local state and frontal and parietal 
attention mechanisms. Information or other mental contents 
become conscious when they enter a functionally defined “work-
space” that makes them globally available to diverse systems and 
modules throughout the brain or mind. Conscious contents are 
thus widely available and highly integrated; all the contents present 
in the global workspace at a time are simultaneously available to 
many “consumers” throughout the mind, as well as being highly 
integrated with each other. 
The neuroscientist Giulio Tononi (2008) has proposed a more 
general abstract theory of consciousness, Integrated Information 
Theory (IIT) that also defines consciousness in terms of integration 
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but does so mathematically in terms of an information theory based 
dimension he labels Φ. What makes a content conscious according 
to IIT is that is included in whatever subsystem has the highest Φ 
value, where Φ is jointly determined by the amount of information 
carried as well as the degree of integration or interdependence 
among those items of information.  
Coming at the problem from a more philosophical and first-
person perspective, the philosopher Tim Bayne (2010) has offered 
a theory of what he calls phenomenal unity, a distinctive form of 
unity present as a phenomenal feature of our experience. As Baynes 
writes, “Over and above these unities is a deeper and more 
primitive unity: the fact that these two experiences possess conjoint 
experiential character. There is something that is like to hear the 
rumba, there is something that it is like to see the bartender work, 
and there is something that it is like to hear the rumba while seeing 
the bartender work. Any description of one’s overall state of con-
sciousness that omitted the fact that these experiences are had 
together as components, parts or elements of a single conscious 
state would be incomplete.” (Bayne 2010)   
Phenomenal unity according to Bayne is a synchronic feature 
of all our experience and involves the sense in which we experience 
all our conscious states as occurring together as the states of a 
single unified self. Bayne’s theory is thus directly relevant to the 
fact noted above about that subjectivity requires a subject. The 
unity of consciousness, at least Bayne’s subjective phenomenal 
unity of consciousness, depends explicitly on its relation to the 
unified subject of experience. Bayne defines phenomenal unity as a 
relation between pairs or groups of experiences: Two experiences 
E1 & E2 are phenomenally unified just if they have a conjoint phenomenal 
character. The latter notion is in turn defined subjectively in terms 
of a special sort of ‘what it is likeness’: E1 & E2 have a conjoint 
phenomenal character just if there is something that it is like to experience 
them together–(where that involves not merely the conjunction of the 
what-it-is-likeness of having an experience of A and the what-it-is-
likeness of having an experience of B, but also the what-it-is-
likeness of having them together – hearing the rumba and tasting the 
coffee…). 
With phenomenally unity thus defined, Bayne goes on to make 
a strong claim about the phenomenal unity of human experience. 
He asserts the Unity Thesis: All the experiences that a conscious subject 
has at a time are phenomenally unified with each other.  It is a claim about 
synchronic unity and asserts that such unity is a universal (and perhaps 
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necessary) feature of all (human) consciousness. According to the 
Unity Thesis, all the experiences that a conscious subject has at a 
moment must be phenomenally unified with each other. Conscious 
subjects never have any experiences at a moment that fail to be 
unified with each other; they are all experienced by the subject as 
conjointly occurring together. 
In assessing the Unity Thesis, a question immediately arises as 
to how to interpret the notion of a subject or single subject. The Unity 
Thesis is a claim about a relation holding among all the experiences 
of a given subject at a moment, but how do we individuate sub-
jects? What must be true for a set of experiences at a moment to 
count as being experiences of one single subject? It is important to avoid 
turning the Unity Thesis into a tautology. Thus Bayne must not 
explain the relation of being experiences of a single subject in terms of 
being experiences that are conjointly experiences. Bayne rightly interprets 
and defines the notion of a single subject independently of experi-
enced conjointness. For most of his 2010 book (chapters 1-11) 
Bayne treats the conscious subject as the human organism. So under-
stood and substituting organism for subject, the Unity Thesis asserts 
that that all the experiences had by a human being qua organism at a 
time are phenomenally unified with each other. 
The Unity Thesis is a factual empirical claim about the reality 
of actual human experience. How well supported is it by the 
empirical evidence, whether that of first person introspection or 
scientific third person investigation? Introspection may seem to 
show that all our experiences are phenomenally unified but perhaps 
that is simply an artifact of introspection. Whenever we look at two 
experiences to ask if they are conjointly experienced, of course we 
find they are. But perhaps that is true only because we are attending 
to them whenever we ask whether or not they are conjoint. Asking 
the question and attending to them may suffice to make them 
conjoint, but it does not settle the matter about all the experiences 
we have any moment to which are not attending and all the experi-
ences we have when we are not asking about conjointness. Intro-
spection’s apparent support for the Unity Thesis could be just a 
case of a so called “refrigerator illusion.” Whenever we look in the 
fridge, the light is on. Whenever we look for conjointness, we find 
it. 
A variety of empirical cases may seem to contradict the Unity 
Thesis, especially ones that involve patients suffering from mental 
deficits that result in certain forms of disunity. Bayne considers 
many such cases and aims to answer each challenge. Among other 
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disorders, he considers anosagnosia (mental deficit together lack of 
awareness of one’s deficit), simultanagnosia (inability to be simul-
taneously conscious of two distinct objects), multiple personality 
(dissociative personality) disorder and split brain cases. Bayne 
attempts to respond to all, but succeeds more convincingly with 
some than with others. 
The ones that pose perhaps the most serious challenge to the 
Unity Thesis are the split brain cases. The description “split brain” 
refers to the fact that for medical reasons such patients have had 
surgery that severed the large bundle of neural fibers that connects 
their two cerebral hemispheres (the corpus callosum). After the 
surgery, they appear normal in everyday situations, but laboratory 
tests show that disconnecting their two hemispheres in fact 
produces an important degree of disunity in perception and action. 
For example, if differing visual stimuli are presented briefly to their 
respective visual fields, the information that reaches the visual 
processing areas of their two hemispheres also differs. Given the 
normal contralateral association between hemispheres and visual 
fields, the severed left hemisphere has access only to the inform-
ation from the right visual field and the right hemisphere has access 
only to the information from the left visual field. In normal subjects 
visual about left and right fields is shared across the corpus 
callosum, but such sharing does not take place in the split brain 
patients. 
The subjects are tested and asked to respond to what they 
briefly saw—e.g. by picking up the matching object (from a set of 
objects behind a screen), or pointing to a picture of an object that 
is related to what they saw. The subjects in these situations respond 
differently with their left and right hands. Indeed they sometimes 
do so simultaneously. Each hand is controlled by a single hemi-
sphere (again the contralateral one—i.e. left hemisphere controls 
the right hand), and thus each hand acts in a way that reflects the 
information available to the hemisphere controlling it. The right 
hand responds to what was in the right visual field because that was 
the information available to the left hemisphere that controls it, 
and the left hand similarly responds to what was shown on the left. 
Interestingly when asked to explain why they responded as they 
did, subjects can accurately explain why they did what they did with 
their right hand, but are typically unable to accurately explain why 
they did what they did with their left hand. When asked to explain, 
they either say they do not know or confabulate, i.e. make an a 
plausible but incorrect story. It is literally a case of “the right hand 
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not knowing what the left hand is doing.” The subjects cannot say 
why they responded as they did with their left hands because lang-
uage is typically lateralized to the left hemisphere, especially in right 
handed people. Given the severed corpus callosum, the left hemi-
sphere regions that control speech do not have access to the right 
hemisphere’s information about the left visual field or about the 
control of the left hand. The right hemisphere language regions can 
thus produce accurate answers only to questions about the sub-
ject’s right hand responses. 
Split brain cases seem to challenge the Unity Thesis. If we 
follow Bayne and define single subject as single human organism, then 
there is only one subject (one human organism) present in the split 
brain cases. Yet that single subject seems to have disunified experi-
ences. In particular it seems that a split brain patient in the test 
situations has simultaneous visual experiences of his right and left 
visual fields—call them ER and EL—that are not phenomenally 
unified. ER and EL are not phenomenally conjoint; the split brain 
subject does not have any what-is-it-likeness of ER and EL co-
occurring as part of his experience.  Bayne offers a response, but 
one that is less than convincing. He proposes a switching model ac-
cording to which consciousness rapidly switches back and forth 
between the left and right hemispheres in split brain cases. Only 
one hemisphere is conscious at a moment. Thus the switching 
model, if it were true, would give the Unity Thesis a way to avoid 
conflict with the split brain cases. If consciousness rapidly switches 
and only one hemisphere is conscious at a given moment, then the 
subject never has ER and EL simultaneously. If they are not simul-
taneous, then the fact that they are not phenomenally unified does 
not contradict the Unity Thesis. Thus the data about the split brain 
cases in itself does not refute the Unity Thesis, but Bayne’s means 
of preserving it requires accepting the switch model, and that 
hypothesis does seem a bit ad hoc and not strongly motivated be-
yond its roles in saving the Unity Thesis. Indeed as noted above, 
split brain subjects sometimes seem to act simultaneously and 
differentially with their two hands. It is difficult to conclusively 
prove that very rapid switching does not occur in such cases, but 
in the absence of strong independent reason to believe in such 
switching, the split brain cases continue to pose an important open 
challenge to the Unity Thesis. 
In the final chapter (chapter 12) of his book, Bayne considers 
a different notion of “conscious subject” that might yield a version 
of the unity thesis as an apriori necessary truth, one that might 
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explain why the Unity Thesis holds for humans. That notion of sub-
ject appeals the idea of the Self as a virtual structure—the point-
of-view of the experiential subject akin to Daniel Dennett’s notion 
of the self as “the center of narrative gravity, according to which 
the self is the point of view of the serial narrative that is created by the 
interpretative “stream of experience” (1992). Importantly on Den-
nett’s view, the self is not the author of the narrative steam. The 
self does not create the story. It is the story (the serial narrative) that is 
primary, and the self is implicit in that story; the self is the point of 
view from which the story coheres. As such the self is an 
intentional structure implied by the story. But would such virtual 
selves be real enough as a theory of the self? Do we need a more 
robust notion of the self as real. Anticipating such criticism Baynes 
writes, “The worry is this: if the self is a ‘merely intentional entity’ 
then does it follow that it is unreal that selves don’t really exist” 
(Bayne 2010, p.292). To this imagined worry he replies, “But there 
is no kind of real self with which our kind of selves could be con-
trasted, for it is in the very nature of selves to be virtual. The kind 
of selves that we possess are as real as selves get. This kind of reality 
might not be enough for some, but I think it provides all the reality 
that we might have reasonably hoped for here. Perhaps more im-
portantly, it provides all the reality that we need.” (Bayne 2010, p. 
293) 
Will virtual selves suffice? We may be reluctant to cocede that. 
We feel virtual selves cannot be the full story; there must be more 
to the self than Bayne’s virtual phenomenalism asserts. How can 
the self be nothing more than an intentional entity, on a par with 
the character from whose point of view the narrative of a novel 
coheres? One intuitively objects, “Surely there must be more to the 
self than that.”  Even if the virtual self is part of the story, it does 
not seem as if it could be the full story of the self. 
Can we adopt the notion of a virtual self but use it in a 
somewhat different way to construct a theory of the self that is 
more robustly realist about the self than Bayne’s virtual pheno-
menalism? I believe may indeed be possible, and I offer in what 
follows a specific proposal that aims to do just that (Van Gulick 
2105). Let us begin by returning to a point raised earlier, to which 
I said we would return: the fact that subjectivity requires a subject. 
Reference to the self is implicit in the very phenomenal and inten-
tional structure of experience. Experiences function and represent 
as experiences of a subject, and thus their intentionality involves an 
inherent reference to a subject or self. Contrary to Humean atom-
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ism, there cannot be a pain that no subject feels, nor an experience 
of red that is not a red for any subject. Similarly, Jean Paul Sartre 
(1943) argued that there can be no object of experience, no “en soi” 
(in itself ) without a “pour soi” (for itself). There must be some 
subject or self for whom it is an experience and to whom the object of 
experience is present. Experience is always experience for a self. It is 
the self in this sense, the self as pour soi, that is implicitly present as 
a part of the phenomenal intentionality of any experience. 
Building on this idea, we can begin to construct an alternative 
theory of the self that incorporates the following principles. 
 
1. A conscious mental state CM (or experience E) can exist at time 
t only if there is “something that it is like” to be in the state (have 
that experience) at t. 
 
2. There can be something that it is like to be in CM (or have 
experience E) at t only if there is some self or subject for whom it is like 
some way to be in CM (or have E) at t. 
 
So the next question is: What must true in for there to be such a 
self or subject for whom it is someway to be in CM (or to have E)? 
 
It is here that the notion of a virtual self gets applied but in a way 
somewhat different way from Bayne or Dennett. The basic idea is 
that a mental state M can exist as a conscious mental state CM (or 
experience E) only if it is contained within a set of representations 
whose contents are integrated or unified in a way that implies the 
existence of a single self or subject. The individual experience must 
occur within that larger intentional structure that implicitly defines 
the perspective of a virtual self. The proposal is to identity the self 
with the total system of experiences when they cohere “as from the 
point of view of a single self.” The virtual self is the point of view 
defined by such a coherent set of experiences, and it is only when 
a set of experiences within a system defines such a coherent point 
of view, i.e. only when it defines a virtual self, that the system of 
experiences itself constitutes a self. The self needs to be construct-
ed, and constructing it is in part of a matter of producing a set of 
experiences that cohere from the point of view of a virtual self. But 
when the process succeeds, the self that is produced is a real self.  
Finally let us return to our initial question. What are our 
prospects for dispelling the mystery of consciousness?  Will we able 
to explain consciousness, especially subjective phenomenal what-
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it-likeness consciousness, in terms of neural or other objective 
physical processes? Will we be able to solve the Hard Problem? At 
present the question remains open. No adequate explanation as yet 
exists that lets see with intuitive understanding how the trick is done. 
But there is reason to believe we are making progress and thus for 
optimism about our eventual success. Theories like the global 
workspace model offer promising models of how many features of 
consciousness might be related to underlying neural substrates. 
Such theories are most promising in dealing with the functional 
aspects of consciousness but less so with subjective phenomenal 
consciousness. However, even with regard to subjectivity there is 
reason to believe that more research will lead to a successful 
constructive theory. And in pursuing that goal we should keep in 
mind, what we just seen so clearly illustrated just above: subjectivity 
requires a subject, and if you want a constructive theory of 
subjective consciousness, you need to figure out how to construct 
a subject or self out of parts that are not. Perhaps by the end of this 
century, the mystery of consciousness will be solved and the 
Gordian knot untied. Or perhaps not. We will have to wait and see. 
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